A Note on Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information

Rafael Rob
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Rafael Rob: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rafael Robb

Management Science, 1985, vol. 31, issue 11, 1431-1439

Abstract: This note reexamines a problem of competitive bidding under asymmetrical information about the value of the object which was originally formulated and studied by R. Wilson (Wilson, R. B. 1967. Competitive bidding with asymmetric information. Management Sci. 13 816--820.). We analyze the Stackelberg equilibria of the game under alternative behavioral assumptions about the sequencing of moves. The relative gains of the seller and the two buyers are computed for specific numerical examples.

Keywords: games/group decisions: bidding; games/group decisions/gambling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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