Optimal Compensation for Data-Sharing in Registration Processes

Klaus Brockhoff
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Klaus Brockhoff: Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, D2300 Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany

Management Science, 1985, vol. 31, issue 9, 1142-1149

Abstract: Data-sharing is suggested or required in various registration procedures to avoid parallel testing of possibly dangerous substances. The question arises what the optimal compensation of an imitator to the innovator would be under such conditions. In a first arbitration award a scheme to determine the compensation is given. We develop another scheme on the basis of the Nash-solution for cooperative games. This is discussed with respect to the Shapley value and the core of the game.

Keywords: games/bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:31:y:1985:i:9:p:1142-1149

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