Competitive Procurement Under Demand Uncertainty

Kofi O. Nti
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Kofi O. Nti: College of Business Administration, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802

Management Science, 1987, vol. 33, issue 11, 1489-1500

Abstract: Stockpilers of commodities in short supply must frequently contend with game-theoretic ramifications arising from the fact that unit purchasing cost increases with aggregate requirements. In this paper, a competitive inventory procurement model for countries facing uncertain demand is analyzed as a game of strategy. Noncooperative and cooperative aspects of the problem are examined. There are significant incentives for cooperating. Some implications of this analysis for strategic petroleum stockpiling models are discussed.

Keywords: inventory; stockpiling models; games/group decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:33:y:1987:i:11:p:1489-1500

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