Modeling Integrative, Multiple Issue Bargaining

Sunil Gupta
Additional contact information
Sunil Gupta: Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027

Management Science, 1989, vol. 35, issue 7, 788-806

Abstract: Integrative, multiple issue bargaining can be expected to characterize many decision making situations in marketing. In this paper we present a mathematical model specifically appropriate to such negotiations. The central features of the model are: (i) the close relation of the structure of the model to integrative, multiple issue bargaining, (ii) the importance of the reference point as a determinant of the final outcome, and (iii) the property of the solution which implies that the balance of overall power is maintained at the final outcome. The equivalence of this model to an axiomatic model of cooperative bargaining is also shown. Regarding the model's predictive ability, results of the reported multiple issue bargaining experiment provide initial support.

Keywords: marketing: bargaining; marketing: channels of distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.7.788 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:35:y:1989:i:7:p:788-806

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().