Signals and Choices in a Competitive Interaction: The Role of Moves and Messages

Marian Chapman Moore
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Marian Chapman Moore: Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27706

Management Science, 1992, vol. 38, issue 4, 483-500

Abstract: This study examines the effect of signals from a competitor on the decisions of managers in a situation of strategic interdependence. The context is a multi-period pricing simulation and the payoffs are structured in accordance with a Prisoner's Dilemma. The signals consist of messages from the competitor and observations of the pricing decisions made by the competitor. The managers' responses to particular types of signals and particular combinations of moves and messages change over the course of the simulation. Suggestions for future research on competitive signaling are offered.

Keywords: marketing; competitive strategy; signalling; games: noncooperative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:38:y:1992:i:4:p:483-500

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