Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test

Thomas Beard and Richard Beil

Management Science, 1994, vol. 40, issue 2, 252-262

Abstract: The assumption that agents engage in maximizing behavior, while ubiquitous in economic theory, differs from the assumption that agents are willing to rely on the maximizing behavior of others. This paper offers an empirical examination of this distinction using experimental methods. Utilizing a series of experimental treatments based on a simple, two player extensive form game of perfect information, we find strong evidence that apparently rational people are often unwilling to rely on the self-interested behavior of others, despite the observed near universality of maximizing play.

Keywords: maximizing behavior; game theory; experimental economics; coordination failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (86)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:40:y:1994:i:2:p:252-262

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