The Delivery and Control of Quality in Supplier-Producer Contracts

Diane J. Reyniers and Charles S. Tapiero
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Diane J. Reyniers: London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AP, United Kingdom
Charles S. Tapiero: ESSEC, 95021 Cergy Pontoise, France

Management Science, 1995, vol. 41, issue 10, 1581-1589

Abstract: We model the effect of contract parameters such as price rebates and after-sales warranty costs on the choice of quality by a supplier, the inspection policy of a producer, and the resulting end product quality. Both noncooperative and cooperative settings are explored. The paper's contribution is to highlight the importance of strategic and contractual issues in quality management.

Keywords: quality control; inspection; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:41:y:1995:i:10:p:1581-1589

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