Maintaining Quality Standards in Franchise Chains

Esther Gal-Or ()

Management Science, 1995, vol. 41, issue 11, 1774-1792

Abstract: In the present paper we identify those characteristics of the markets served by a franchise chain which determine the relative incentives of the owner of the chain to monitor the behavior of individual franchisees. We find that the owner has greater incentives to monitor the outlets that serve the relatively smaller markets and those that are subject to greater fluctuations in the state of the demand confronting them. We also find that the extent of competition with other chains has an ambiguous effect on the incentives to monitor the franchisees:

Keywords: marketing; channels of distribution; franchising; quality management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:41:y:1995:i:11:p:1774-1792

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