Hiring and Leasing with Nonlinear Prices

Ian Dobbs ()

Management Science, 1995, vol. 41, issue 11, 1793-1805

Abstract: This paper examines the problem of a monopolist setting an optimal nonlinear pricing schedule in the face of consumers of unknown type who arrive randomly over time and self-select a choice of hire period. The major determinant of pricing policy is the customer arrival distribution, with the overall level of price higher than in the atemporal yield management/nonuniform pricing solution by a margin which increases with the average frequency with which potential customers arrive. By contrast, the solution is generally fairly insensitive to variations in the time rate of discount, although there is a tendency for the rate of price discount to increase with increases in the time discount rate.

Keywords: hiring; leasing; nonuniform pricing; price discrimination; quantity discounts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.11.1793 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:41:y:1995:i:11:p:1793-1805

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().