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A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication

A. van den Nouweland, Peter Borm, W. van Golstein Brouwers, R. Groot Bruinderink and S. Tijs
Additional contact information
A. van den Nouweland: Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
W. van Golstein Brouwers: PTT Research, P.O. Box 421, 2260 AK Leidschendam, The Netherlands
R. Groot Bruinderink: Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
S. Tijs: Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

Management Science, 1996, vol. 42, issue 2, 294-303

Abstract: This paper considers two specific problems in telecommunication, namely the Terrestrial Flight Telephone System and the rerouting of international telephone calls. Both situations are modelled as coalitional games, and game theoretic techniques are used to tackle the problems. It is shown that a special class of coalitional games emerges from the situations under consideration and that the structure of the situations has theoretical implications, including the coincidence of several game theoretic solution concepts. The implications of these theoretical results for the two practical problems are discussed.

Keywords: terrestrial flight telephone system; rerouting of telephone calls; revenue apportionment; coalitional games; solution concepts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (80)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.2.294 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication (1994)
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