Predecisional Distortion of Information by Auditors and Salespersons

J. Edward Russo (), Margaret G. Meloy () and T. Jeffrey Wilks ()
Additional contact information
J. Edward Russo: Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853
Margaret G. Meloy: Department of Marketing, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0236
T. Jeffrey Wilks: Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853

Management Science, 2000, vol. 46, issue 1, 13-27

Abstract: As people are deciding between two alternatives, they may distort new information to support whichever alternative is tentatively preferred. The presence of such predecisional distortion of information was tested in decisions made by two groups of professionals, auditors and salespersons. Both groups exhibited substantial distortion of information, with little reduction for professional decisions compared to nonprofessional ones. However, auditors' distortion was significantly smaller than that of salespersons. In addition, holding professionals accountable for their decisions, akin to a supervisory review, lowered distortion somewhat for salespersons but not at all for auditors. The latter seemed to act as if they were always being held accountable. Because people seem unaware that they are distorting information, at least at the moment this bias is occurring, they are fully convinced of the soundness of their choices. This may make it difficult for distortion to be detected by decision makers themselves or even by supervisors who cannot completely duplicate their subordinate's knowledge.

Keywords: Decision Making; Accountability; Bias in Judgments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.1.13.15127 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:46:y:2000:i:1:p:13-27

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().