A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service

Frank Kelly () and Richard Steinberg ()
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Frank Kelly: University of Cambridge, Statistical Laboratory, Cambridge, England CB2 1SB
Richard Steinberg: University of Cambridge, The Judge Institute, Cambridge, England CB2 1AG

Management Science, 2000, vol. 46, issue 4, 586-596

Abstract: We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of Last Resort) responsibility for universal service. The auction incorporates synergies by permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to the bidders, allows for multiple winners, and minimizes the possibility of bidder collusion. The procedure is computationally tractable for the auctioneer and thus very efficient to run. The inherent computational complexity of combinatorial bidding cannot be eliminated. However, in this auction the computational burden of evaluating synergies rests with the bidders claiming those synergies, while the auctioneer simply checks that a bid is valid.

Keywords: auctions; combinatorial bidding; universal service; carrier of last resort; telecommunications; synergies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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