The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions

Wedad Elmaghraby ()
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Wedad Elmaghraby: Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332

Management Science, 2003, vol. 49, issue 5, 673-682

Abstract: To date, the largest part of literature on multi-unit auctions has assumed that there are k homogeneous objects being auctioned, where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all of k units. These modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential. The aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction. We study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd-price auctions two heterogeneous jobs, and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints.

Keywords: Auctions; Sequential; Vickrey; Procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:49:y:2003:i:5:p:673-682

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