Investment Implications of Information Acquisition and Leakage

Ronald A. Dye () and Sri S. Sridhar ()
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Ronald A. Dye: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60208-2002
Sri S. Sridhar: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60208-2002

Management Science, 2003, vol. 49, issue 6, 767-783

Abstract: This paper studies when a firm will acquire additional information about a potential new project by consulting outsiders, when doing so runs the risk of reducing the value of implementing the project as a consequence of information leakage. The analysis evaluates the firm's information acquisition activities in both the presence and absence of moral hazard in project production.

Keywords: Information Acquisition; Proprietary Costs; Moral Hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:49:y:2003:i:6:p:767-783

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