Multiperson Tournaments: An Experimental Examination

Alannah Orrison (), Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt ()
Additional contact information
Alannah Orrison: Department of Economics, Saddleback College, Mission Viejo, California 92692
Keith Weigelt: Department of Management, The Wharton School, 2000 Steinberg Hall---Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6370

Management Science, 2004, vol. 50, issue 2, 268-279

Abstract: Modern hierarchical organizations, like corporations, must motivate agents to work hard. Given their pyramid structure, it is not surprising that one commonly used motivator is the promotion tournament. In such tournaments, agents compete to advance to positions at higher organizational levels. Though these tournaments are common, little research has empirically looked at the interface of organizational structure and tournament design. This paper aims to take a step in filling this void by comparing the performance of various tournament designs using controlled laboratory techniques.

Keywords: tournaments; economic experiments; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (97)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:50:y:2004:i:2:p:268-279

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