Self-Interested Routing in Queueing Networks

Ali K. Parlaktürk () and Sunil Kumar ()
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Ali K. Parlaktürk: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
Sunil Kumar: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Management Science, 2004, vol. 50, issue 7, 949-966

Abstract: We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with performance comparable to the first-best solution.

Keywords: queueing networks; routing; scheduling; Nash equilibrium; mechanism design; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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