Markov Perfect Equilibrium Advertising Strategies of Lanchester Duopoly Model: A Technical Note

Ramla Jarrar (), Guiomar Martin-Herran and Georges Zaccour
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Ramla Jarrar: GERAD and HEC Montréal, 3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, Québec, H3T 2A7 Canada

Management Science, 2004, vol. 50, issue 7, 995-1000

Abstract: We propose a numerical approach to compute stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the Lanchester model. The algorithm can be implemented using a standard mathematical package, and, importantly, it does not require that the players discount their future earnings at a zero rate, an assumption that has been made in the literature.

Keywords: Lanchester model; advertising strategies; Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:50:y:2004:i:7:p:995-1000

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