Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method

Nolan Miller (), Paul Resnick () and Richard Zeckhauser
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Nolan Miller: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Paul Resnick: School of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1092

Management Science, 2005, vol. 51, issue 9, 1359-1373

Abstract: Many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities, products, and vendors. A scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback. Each rater merely reports a signal, and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater's report. Honest reporting proves to be a Nash equilibrium. The scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals. We also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems.

Keywords: proper scoring rules; electronic markets; honest feedback (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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