A Theory of Banks' Industry Expertise, Market Power, and Credit Risk

Alex Stomper

Management Science, 2006, vol. 52, issue 10, 1618-1633

Abstract: The author analyzes banks' incentives to acquire expertise in judging the creditworthiness of borrowers in an industry with uncertain business conditions. The analysis shows that industry expertise enables banks to extract rents proportional to their exposure to industry-specific credit risk. This exposure is in turn determined by the number of banks aiming to focus on lending to an industry. In equilibrium, the industry receives funding from a limited number of banks with industry expertise, as well as from a competitive fringe of financiers without such expertise. The equilibrium yields testable predictions about the concentration of bank lending to an industry, and about the correlation between this concentration and the recovery rates, default rates, and interest rates of bank loans.

Keywords: bank lending; market power; industry expertise; credit risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0559 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:52:y:2006:i:10:p:1618-1633

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().