A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication Network

Edward Anderson (), Frank Kelly () and Richard Steinberg ()
Additional contact information
Edward Anderson: Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Frank Kelly: Statistical Laboratory, Centre for Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge CB3 0WB, United Kingdom
Richard Steinberg: Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom

Management Science, 2006, vol. 52, issue 1, 39-53

Abstract: We propose a method for determining how much to charge users of a communication network when they share bandwidth. Our approach can be employed either when a network owner wishes to sell bandwidth for a specified period of time to a number of different users, or when users cooperate to build a network to be shared among themselves. Our proposed contract and balancing mechanism can mediate between rapidly fluctuating prices and the longer time scales over which bandwidth contracts may be traded. An advantage of the process is that it avoids perverse incentives for a capacity provider to increase congestion.

Keywords: capacity contracts; congestion pricing; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0455 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:52:y:2006:i:1:p:39-53

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().