Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-ups

Bruno Cassiman and Masako Ueda ()
Additional contact information
Masako Ueda: School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 975 University Avenue, Madison, Wisconsin 53706

Management Science, 2006, vol. 52, issue 2, 262-275

Abstract: We study the decision of an established firm to commercialize innovations. An innovation can be exploited by the established firm as an internal venture, pursued by a new firm start-up as an external venture, or not commercialized at all. The limited commercialization capacity of the established firm in the short run results in an option value of waiting. In this setup, start-up firms emerge when the established firm is generating many innovations or is selective because the option value of waiting is high, or both. The model predicts that innovations commercialized through internal ventures are characterized by a higher fit with the internal resources of the established firm, a higher cannibalization of the established firm's existing businesses, and a lower profitability than innovations commercialized through external ventures. The model furthermore generates predictions on the relation between firm performance and spin-off performance.

Keywords: real option; project selection; new firm start-ups; IPR; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0458 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups (2002)
Working Paper: Optimal project rejection and new firm start-ups (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:52:y:2006:i:2:p:262-275

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().