Erratum--A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication Network

Edward Anderson (), Frank Kelly (), Richard Steinberg () and Robert Waters ()
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Edward Anderson: Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Frank Kelly: Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 0WB, United Kingdom
Richard Steinberg: Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom
Robert Waters: Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom

Management Science, 2007, vol. 53, issue 6, 1029-1031

Abstract: In a recent paper, the first three authors proposed a method for determining how much to charge users of a communication network when they share bandwidth, and studied the existence and form of Nash equilibria for players' choices of capacity. However, the proof of one of the propositions in that paper contained a flaw. In this note, we prove that the original proposition is true under an additional condition, and provide two examples to show that this condition is necessary.

Keywords: capacity contracts; congestion pricing; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:53:y:2007:i:6:p:1029-1031

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