Competitive Incentives: Working Harder or Working Smarter?

Anat Bracha and Chaim Fershtman ()
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Chaim Fershtman: The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978; Centre for Economic Policy Research, London EC1V 3PZ, United Kingdom; and Tinbergen Institute, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Management Science, 2013, vol. 59, issue 4, 771-781

Abstract: Almost all jobs require a combination of cognitive effort and labor effort. This paper focuses on the effect that competitive incentive schemes have on the chosen combination of these two types of efforts. We use an experimental approach to show that competitive incentives may induce agents to work harder but not necessarily smarter. This effect was stronger for women. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

Keywords: behavioral economics; individual decision making; lab experiment; competitive incentives; work effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1597 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive incentives: working harder or working smarter? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:59:y:2013:i:4:p:771-781

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