Crowdsourcing with All-Pay Auctions: A Field Experiment on Taskcn

Tracy Liu, Jiang Yang (), Lada A. Adamic () and Yan Chen
Additional contact information
Jiang Yang: IBM, Armonk, New York 10504
Lada A. Adamic: School of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

Management Science, 2014, vol. 60, issue 8, 2020-2037

Abstract: To explore the effects of different incentives on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, we conduct a randomized field experiment on Taskcn, a large Chinese crowdsourcing site using mechanisms with features of an all-pay auction. In our study, we systematically vary the size of the reward as well as the presence of a soft reserve, or early high-quality submission. We find that a higher reward induces significantly more submissions and submissions of higher quality. In comparison, we find that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high-quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower overall quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

Keywords: crowdsourcing; field experiment; all-pay auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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