Financial Distress Risk and New CEO Compensation

Woo-Jin Chang (), Rachel M. Hayes () and Stephen A. Hillegeist ()
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Woo-Jin Chang: Accounting and Management Control, HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France; and Accounting and Control Area, INSEAD, 77300 Fontainebleau, France
Rachel M. Hayes: David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
Stephen A. Hillegeist: School of Accountancy, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287

Management Science, 2016, vol. 62, issue 2, 479-501

Abstract: We examine how ex ante financial distress risk affects CEO compensation. To disentangle the joint effects of performance on compensation and distress risk, we focus our analyses on new CEOs. Our results indicate that financial distress risk affects compensation through two channels. First, new CEOs receive significantly more compensation when financial distress risk is higher. This finding is consistent with CEOs receiving a compensation premium for bearing this risk since CEOs experience large personal costs if their firms later become financially distressed. Second, financial distress risk is associated with the incentives provided to new CEOs; distress risk is positively associated with pay-performance sensitivity and equity-based compensation and is negatively associated with cash bonuses. Further, financial distress risk is positively associated with pay-risk sensitivity for new CEOs. These findings suggest that financial distress risk alters the nature of the agency relationship in ways that lead firms to provide CEOs with more equity-based incentives. We also build on research that finds a positive relation between forced turnover risk and CEO compensation. Our analyses suggest the compensation effects of forced turnover risk appear to be mainly attributable to financial distress risk. Overall, our results indicate financial distress risk is an economically important determinant of new CEO compensation packages. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting .

Keywords: CEO compensation; compensation premium; CEO incentives; financial distress risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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