Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory

Alexander Peysakhovich () and David G. Rand ()
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Alexander Peysakhovich: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; and Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
David G. Rand: Department of Psychology, Department of Economics, School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520

Management Science, 2016, vol. 62, issue 3, 631-647

Abstract: What explains variability in norms of cooperation across organizations and cultures? One answer comes from the tendency of individuals to internalize typically successful behaviors as norms. Different institutional structures can cause different behavioral norms to be internalized. These norms are then carried over into atypical situations beyond the reach of the institution. Here, we experimentally demonstrate such spillovers. First, we immerse subjects in environments that do or do not support cooperation using repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. Afterwards, we measure their intrinsic prosociality in one-shot games. Subjects from environments that support cooperation are more prosocial, more likely to punish selfishness, and more trusting in general. Furthermore, these effects are most pronounced among subjects who use heuristics, suggesting that intuitive processes play a key role in the spillovers we observe. Our findings help to explain variation in one-shot anonymous cooperation, linking this intrinsically motivated prosociality to the externally imposed institutional rules experienced in other settings.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

Keywords: economics; behavior and behavioral decision making; economics; game theory and bargaining theory; organizational studies; decision making; games–group decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

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