The Surprising Effectiveness of Hostile Mediators

Ting Zhang (), Francesca Gino () and Michael I. Norton ()
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Ting Zhang: Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
Francesca Gino: Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts 02163
Michael I. Norton: Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts 02163

Management Science, 2017, vol. 63, issue 6, 1972-1992

Abstract: Contrary to the tendency of mediators to defuse negative emotions between adversaries by treating them kindly, we demonstrate the surprising effectiveness of hostile mediators in resolving conflict. Hostile mediators generate greater willingness to reach agreements between adversaries (Experiment 1). Consequently, negotiators interacting with hostile mediators are better able to reach agreements in incentive-compatible negotiations than those interacting with nice mediators (Experiment 2). By serving as common enemies, hostile mediators cause adversaries in conflict to feel more connected and become more willing to reach agreement (Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, we manipulate the target of mediators’ hostility to document the moderating role of common enemies: mediators who directed their hostility toward both negotiators (bilateral hostility)—becoming a common enemy—increased willingness to reach agreement; those who directed hostility at just one negotiator (unilateral hostility) did not serve as common enemies, eliminating the hostile mediator effect (Experiment 5). We discuss theoretical and practical implications, and we suggest future directions.

Keywords: mediation; conflict; negotiation; emotions; hostility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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