Do Unions Affect Innovation?

Daniel Bradley (), Incheol Kim () and Xuan Tian
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Daniel Bradley: Department of Finance, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida 33620
Incheol Kim: Department of Finance, Fordham University, New York, New York 10023

Management Science, 2017, vol. 63, issue 7, 2251-2271

Abstract: We examine the effect of unionization on firm innovation, using a regression discontinuity design that relies on “locally” exogenous variation generated by elections that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. Passing a union election results in an 8.7% (12.5%) decline in patent quantity (quality) three years after the election. A reduction in R&D expenditures, reduced productivity of inventors, and departures of innovative inventors appear to be plausible underlying mechanisms through which unionization impedes firm innovation. In response to unionization, firms move their innovation activities away from states where union elections win. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of unionization.

Keywords: innovation; labor unions; hold-up; shirking; inventor departures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (97)

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