Understanding Bank-Run Contagion

Martin Brown, Stefan Trautmann and Razvan Vlahu

Management Science, 2017, vol. 63, issue 7, 2272-2282

Abstract: We study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels and under which information conditions a panic-based depositor run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players’ beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Observed withdrawals only affect depositors’ beliefs, and are thus contagious when they form an informative signal about bank fundamentals.

Keywords: contagion; bank runs; systemic risk; asset commonality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2416 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Understanding bank-run contagion (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:63:y:2017:i:7:p:2272-2282

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