Incentives for Prosocial Behavior: The Role of Reputations

Christine Exley ()
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Christine Exley: Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts 02163

Management Science, 2018, vol. 64, issue 5, 2460-2471

Abstract: Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns—such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy—relates to individuals’ volunteer reputations. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.

Keywords: incentives; image motivation; reputations; volunteer; prosocial behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:64:y:2018:i:5:p:2460-2471

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