Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank

Kathrin Manthei () and Dirk Sliwka ()
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Kathrin Manthei: RFH Cologne, University of Applied Sciences, 50676 Cologne, Germany
Dirk Sliwka: Faculty of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of Cologne, CesIfo, IZA, 50937 Cologne, Germany

Management Science, 2019, vol. 65, issue 12, 5861-5883

Abstract: We study the incentive effects of granting supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted toward more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group, managers obtained access to objective performance measures, which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products.

Keywords: incentives; subjective performance evaluation; multitasking; field experiment; bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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