On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study

Matteo Galizzi and Daniel Navarro-Martinez ()
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Daniel Navarro-Martinez: Department of Economics and Business, Pompeu Fabra University, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; and Barcelona School of Management, 08008 Barcelona, Spain

Management Science, 2019, vol. 65, issue 3, 976-1002

Abstract: We present a lab-field experiment designed to systematically assess the external validity of social preferences elicited in a variety of experimental games. We do this by comparing behavior in the different games with several behaviors elicited in the field and with self-reported behaviors exhibited in the past, using the same sample of participants. Our results show that the experimental social preference games do a poor job explaining both social behaviors in the field and social behaviors from the past. We also include a systematic review and meta-analysis of previous literature on the external validity of social preference games.

Keywords: field behavior; external validity; experimental games; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2908 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On the external validity of social preference games: a systematic lab-field study (2019)
Working Paper: On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study (2015)
Working Paper: On the external validity of social-preference games: A systematic lab-field study (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:65:y:2019:i:3:p:976-1002

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