Channel Auctions

Eduardo Azevedo, David M. Pennock (), Bo Waggoner () and E. Glen Weyl ()
Additional contact information
David M. Pennock: Microsoft Research, Redmond, Washington 98052;
Bo Waggoner: University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80303
E. Glen Weyl: Microsoft Research, Redmond, Washington 98052;

Management Science, 2020, vol. 66, issue 5, 2075-2082

Abstract: Standard auction formats feature either an upper bound on the equilibrium price that descends over time (as in the Dutch auction) or a lower bound on the equilibrium price that ascends over time (as in the English auction). We show that in some settings with costly information acquisition, auctions featuring both (viz., a narrowing channel of prices) outperform the standard formats. This Channel auction preserves some of benefits of both the English (truthful revelation) and Dutch (security for necessary information acquisition) auctions. Natural applications include housing, online auction sites like eBay, recording transactions on blockchains, and spectrum rights.

Keywords: games group decisions; bidding auctions; marketing; pricing; economics; game theory; bargaining theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:5:p:2075-2082

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