Economics at your fingertips  

Crowdfunding, Financing Constraints, and Real Effects

Praveen Kumar (), Nisan Langberg () and David Zvilichovsky ()
Additional contact information
Nisan Langberg: University of Houston, Houston, Texas 77004; Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, 6997801 Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel
David Zvilichovsky: Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, 6997801 Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel

Management Science, 2020, vol. 66, issue 8, 3561-3580

Abstract: We study the feasibility and optimal design of presale crowdfunding contracts where participating consumers pay a premium above the future expected spot price and financially constrained entrepreneurs balance the potential product–market distortions introduced through presale crowdfunding against the cost of traditional external financing. Our analysis shows how such crowdfunding contracts enable the execution of projects that could not be otherwise undertaken and highlights novel interactions between the cost of capital, demand uncertainty, and production. Tighter financing constraints reduce the ability of the monopolist to extract surplus but, contrary to the usual result, may increase production. We evaluate how uncertainty and market size reduce the price-discriminating power of the monopolist and affect the optimal contract regime. Nevertheless, we show how such presale price-discriminating contracts are implementable even when the number of potential consumers is relatively high and their individual demand is stochastic.

Keywords: crowdfunding; financing platforms; pivotal contracts; price discrimination; financing constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthew Walls ().

Page updated 2020-12-15
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:8:p:3561-3580