Informing the Public About a Pandemic

Francis de Véricourt (), Huseyin Gurkan () and Shouqiang Wang ()
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Francis de Véricourt: European School of Management and Technology, Berlin 10178 , Germany
Huseyin Gurkan: European School of Management and Technology, Berlin 10178 , Germany
Shouqiang Wang: Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080

Management Science, 2021, vol. 67, issue 10, 6350-6357

Abstract: This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease’s economic impact on the population, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.

Keywords: public health; epidemic control; information design; strategic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:10:p:6350-6357

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