If It Is Surely Better, Do It More? Implications for Preferences Under Ambiguity
Soheil Ghili () and
Peter Klibanoff ()
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Soheil Ghili: School of Management and Cowles Foundation, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
Peter Klibanoff: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208
Management Science, 2021, vol. 67, issue 12, 7619-7636
Abstract:
Consider a canonical problem in choice under uncertainty: choosing from a convex feasible set consisting of all (Anscombe–Aumann) mixtures of two acts f and g, { α f + ( 1 − α ) g : α ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] } . We propose a preference condition, monotonicity in optimal mixtures , which says that surely improving the act f (in the sense of weak dominance) makes the optimal weight(s) on f weakly higher. We use a stylized model of a sales agent reacting to incentives to illustrate the tight connection between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and a monotone comparative static of interest in applications. We then explore more generally the relation between this condition and preferences exhibiting ambiguity-sensitive behavior as in the classic Ellsberg paradoxes. We find that monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion (even only local to an event) are incompatible for a large and popular class of ambiguity-sensitive preferences (the c-linearly biseparable class. This implies, for example, that maxmin expected utility preferences are consistent with monotonicity in optimal mixtures if and only if they are subjective expected utility preferences. This incompatibility is not between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion per se. For example, we show that smooth ambiguity preferences can satisfy both properties as long as they are not too ambiguity averse. Our most general result, applying to an extremely broad universe of preferences, shows a sense in which monotonicity in optimal mixtures places upper bounds on the intensity of ambiguity-averse behavior.
Keywords: ambiguity; uncertainty; decision analysis theory; utility-preference theory; ambiguity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:12:p:7619-7636
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