EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic Risk Shifting and the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle: An Empirical Investigation

Zhiyao Chen (), Ilya A. Strebulaev (), Yuhang Xing () and Xiaoyan Zhang ()
Additional contact information
Zhiyao Chen: Chinese University of Hong Kong Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Ilya A. Strebulaev: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
Yuhang Xing: National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University, Houston, Texas 77005

Management Science, 2021, vol. 67, issue 5, 2751-2772

Abstract: We find strong empirical support for the risk-shifting mechanism to account for the puzzling negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future stock returns. First, equity holders take on investments with high idiosyncratic risk when their firms are in distress and receive less monitoring from institutional holders as well as when the aggregate economy is in a bad state. Second, the strategically increased idiosyncratic volatility decreases equity betas, particularly in bad states when the market risk premium is high. The negative covariance between the equity beta and the market risk premium causes low and negative returns and alphas in firms with high idiosyncratic volatility.

Keywords: risk shifting; agency conflicts; idiosyncratic volatility puzzle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3593 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:5:p:2751-2772

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:5:p:2751-2772