When Is Society Susceptible to Manipulation?

Mohamed Mostagir (), Asuman Ozdaglar () and James Siderius ()
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Mohamed Mostagir: Ross Business School, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
Asuman Ozdaglar: Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
James Siderius: Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Management Science, 2022, vol. 68, issue 10, 7153-7175

Abstract: We consider a social learning model where agents learn about an underlying state of the world from individual observations as well as from exchanging information with each other. A principal (e.g., a firm or a government) interferes with the learning process in order to manipulate the beliefs of the agents. By utilizing the same forces that give rise to the “wisdom of the crowd” phenomenon, the principal can get the agents to take an action that is not necessarily optimal for them but is in the principal’s best interest. We characterize the social norms and network structures that are susceptible to this kind of manipulation and derive conditions under which a social network is impervious and cannot be manipulated. In the process, we develop a new centrality measure and describe how our model offers insights into designing networks that are resistant to manipulation.

Keywords: social networks; opinion dynamics; behavioral models; strategic interventions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:10:p:7153-7175

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