Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions

Szu-Yin (Jennifer) Wu () and Kee H. Chung ()
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Szu-Yin (Jennifer) Wu: School of Management, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York (SUNY), Buffalo, New York 14260
Kee H. Chung: School of Management, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York (SUNY), Buffalo, New York 14260; SKK Business School, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul 03063, Republic of Korea

Management Science, 2022, vol. 68, issue 2, 1378-1403

Abstract: This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms’ M&A activities through interventions.

Keywords: hedge fund activism; M&A performance; Schedule 13D filings; event study; abnormal stock returns; corporate governance; selection bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:2:p:1378-1403

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