Third-Party Consequences of Changes in Managerial Fiduciary Duties: The Case of Auditors’ Going Concern Opinions

Liang Tan (), Santhosh Ramalingegowda () and Yong Yu ()
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Liang Tan: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061
Santhosh Ramalingegowda: University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602
Yong Yu: University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712

Management Science, 2022, vol. 68, issue 2, 1556-1572

Abstract: This study examines the effect of managerial fiduciary duties on the likelihood of firms receiving going concern (GC) opinions from their auditors. We exploit an influential 1991 legal ruling that expanded fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers in favor of creditors for near-insolvent Delaware firms. Our difference-in-differences test reveals an increase in GC opinions following the ruling for near-insolvent Delaware firms. Further tests indicate an increase in type I audit opinion errors and no change in audit risk after the ruling. Additional analysis shows that, after the ruling, near-insolvent Delaware firms are less likely to dismiss their auditors following the receipt of a GC report. Overall, our findings are consistent with managers and directors with increased fiduciary duties toward creditors exerting less pressure on auditors and allowing them to reveal more GC opinions. Our results highlight important third-party consequences of changes in managerial fiduciary duties.

Keywords: Credit Lyonnais ruling; fiduciary duties; going concern opinions; auditors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:2:p:1556-1572

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