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Trust, Incomplete Contracting, and Corporate Innovation

Fei Xie (), Bohui Zhang () and Wenrui Zhang ()
Additional contact information
Fei Xie: University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716; European Corporate Governance Institute, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Bohui Zhang: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, 518172 Shenzhen, China
Wenrui Zhang: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

Management Science, 2022, vol. 68, issue 5, 3419-3443

Abstract: Innovation is a contract-intensive economic activity in a world of incomplete contracts. We show that trust mitigates incomplete contracting and enhances innovation by acting as an informal contracting mechanism. Trust plays an especially important role when formal laws and regulations are lacking, and it promotes innovation by encouraging collaboration and fostering tolerance for failure. Further analyses show that trust also facilitates cross-border technological spillover and innovation collaboration. Overall, our evidence highlights innovation as a key conduit through which trust affects economic growth.

Keywords: trust; innovation; incomplete contracting; collaboration; risk taking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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