Talking Behind Your Back: Communication and Team Cooperation

Klaus Abbink, Lu Dong () and Lingbo Huang ()
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Lu Dong: Economics Experimental Laboratory, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China
Lingbo Huang: Economics Experimental Laboratory, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China

Management Science, 2022, vol. 68, issue 7, 5187-5200

Abstract: Communication is one of the most effective devices in promoting team cooperation. However, asymmetric communication sometimes breeds collusion and hurts team efficiency. Here, we present experimental evidence showing that excluding one member from team communication hurts team cooperation; the communicating partners collude in profit allocation against the excluded member, and the latter reacts by exerting less effort. Allowing the partners to reach out to the excluded member partially restores cooperation and fairness in profit allocation, but it does not stop the partners from talking behind that member’s back even when they could have talked publicly. The partners sometimes game the system by tricking the excluded member into contributing but then grabbing all profits for themselves.

Keywords: communication; fairness; collusion; allocation; team cooperation; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:7:p:5187-5200

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