Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the U.S. Supplemental Security Income Program

C. Yiwei Zhang (), Jeffrey Hemmeter (), Judd B. Kessler (), Robert Metcalfe () and Robert Weathers ()
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C. Yiwei Zhang: Department of Consumer Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706
Jeffrey Hemmeter: Office of Research, Demonstration, and Employment Support, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Judd B. Kessler: Business Economics and Public Policy Department, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Robert Weathers: Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland 21235

Management Science, 2023, vol. 69, issue 3, 1341-1353

Abstract: We study a large-scale ( n = 50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. A letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total earnings reported. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings per dollar spent, highlighting the value of such a nudge in this important context.

Keywords: nudges; field experiment; public policy; wage reporting; disability and work (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:3:p:1341-1353

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