Empirical Model of Dynamic Merger Enforcement—Choosing Ownership Caps in U.S. Radio

Przemysław Jeziorski ()
Additional contact information
Przemysław Jeziorski: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720

Management Science, 2023, vol. 69, issue 8, 4457-4480

Abstract: The paper introduces a method to conduct a forward-looking antitrust review of horizontal mergers. The method utilizes a dynamic oligopoly model in which mergers, entry/exit, and product repositioning are endogenous. The model provides long-run industry trajectories with and without the merger under review, enabling the regulator to obtain dynamically robust welfare comparisons. The paper demonstrates the framework’s application to regulate the U.S. radio broadcasting industry. In particular, it investigates the long-run efficacy of two commonly used merger heuristics: radio station ownership caps (see the Telecom Act of 1996) and static merger simulations. The paper finds that raising the ownership cap results in higher total welfare and demonstrates varying long-run effectiveness of merger simulations.

Keywords: mergers; antitrust; dynamic model; structural model; radio industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4599 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:8:p:4457-4480

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().