Paying for Performance in Public Pension Plans
Yan Lu (),
Kevin Mullally () and
Sugata Ray ()
Additional contact information
Yan Lu: College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida 32827
Kevin Mullally: College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida 32827
Sugata Ray: Culverhouse College of Business, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 34587
Management Science, 2023, vol. 69, issue 8, 4888-4907
Abstract:
We examine the relation between public pension plan chief investment officer (CIO) compensation and plans’ investment performance. Higher paid CIOs outperform their counterparts by 47–60 basis points per year, largely through increased and superior investment in private equity and real estate. This outperformance generates an additional $74.91–$95.63 million in economic value. Plans offering higher compensation hire better educated CIOs and are more likely to retain their CIOs. Higher CIO compensation is positively correlated with the use of incentive compensation, but incentive compensation does not directly affect performance. Demand- and supply-side frictions help explain the variation in CIO pay and the persistent low compensation paid by some plans despite the positive relation between compensation and performance.
Keywords: public pension fund performance; compensation; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4554 (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:8:p:4888-4907
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().