Rival Signals and Project Selection: Insights from the Drug Development Process
Panos Markou (),
Stylianos Kavadias () and
Nektarios Oraiopoulos ()
Additional contact information
Panos Markou: Darden School of Business, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903
Stylianos Kavadias: Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom
Nektarios Oraiopoulos: Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom
Management Science, 2023, vol. 69, issue 9, 5298-5315
Abstract:
Project selection decisions are complex because they must balance not only financial returns, project risk, and fit with strategy, but also competitive circumstances. A rival’s project development efforts provide two pieces of information: a market rivalry signal, indicating potentially heightened competition in a market, and a technological signal, indicating a possible solution to a problem in that market. We hypothesize that these signals affect a firm’s likelihood of project selection in opposite directions, and that the timing of the signals matters for selection. We examine the drug development pipelines of the top 15 pharmaceutical companies from 1999 to 2016 to examine how rival projects drive the decision to progress a drug from preclinical laboratory trials to clinical trials in humans. Early-stage rival projects provide a stronger market rivalry signal, and they are associated with a decreased likelihood of the firm selecting its own project to compete in the same market. Late-stage rival projects signal technological feasibility and are associated with an increase in the likelihood of selection. We then exploit heterogeneity in market potential (i.e., disorder prevalence/incidence) and a molecular compound’s technology (i.e., therapeutic modality) to independently manipulate the salience of the two signals. Finally, we provide evidence on how selection based on rival signals informs project success. Information from rival projects prompts the selection of more successful drugs, but only after a threshold when sufficient uncertainty has been resolved.
Keywords: project selection; new product development; spillovers; competition; R&D management; pharmaceutical industry; empirical (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4642 (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:9:p:5298-5315
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().