Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism

Vijay Mohan (), Peyman Khezr () and Chris Berg ()
Additional contact information
Vijay Mohan: Blockchain Innovation Hub, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia; Lattice Analytics Pty Ltd, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia
Peyman Khezr: School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia
Chris Berg: Blockchain Innovation Hub, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 12, 8709-8734

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the usefulness of time commitment as a voting resource for decentralized governance when the identity of voters cannot be verified. In order to do so, we take a closer look at two issues that confront token-based voting systems used by blockchain communities and organizations: voter fraud through the creation of multiple identities (Sybil attack) and concentration of voting power in the hands of the wealthy (plutocracy). Our contribution is threefold: first, we lay analytical foundations for the formal modeling of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voting system to be resistant to a Sybil attack; second, we show that tokens as the only instrument for weighting votes cannot simultaneously achieve resistance to both Sybil attacks and a plutocracy in the voting process; and third, we design a voting mechanism, bond voting, that is Sybil resistant and offers a second instrument (time commitment) that is effective for countering plutocracy when large token holders also have a relatively high opportunity cost of locking tokens for a vote. Overall, our paper emphasizes the importance of time-based suffrage in decentralized governance.

Keywords: decentralized governance; blockchain; time commitment; voting; Sybil resistance; plutocracy; bonds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01536 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:12:p:8709-8734

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().