Fiscal Limits and the Pricing of Eurobonds
Kevin Pallara () and
Jean-Paul Renne
Additional contact information
Kevin Pallara: DG Economics, Statistics and Research, Banca d’Italia, 00184 Roma, Italy
Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 2, 1216-1237
Abstract:
This paper proposes a methodology to price bonds jointly issued by a group of countries—Eurobonds in the euro-area context. We consider two types of bonds; the first is backed by several and joint guarantees (SJGs), and the second features several but not joint guarantees (SNJGs). The pricing of SJG and SNJG bonds reflects different assumptions regarding the pooling of debtors’ fiscal resources. We estimate fiscal limits for the six largest euro-area economies over 2008–2021 and deduce counterfactual Eurobond prices. For the five-year maturity, SNJG bond yield spreads would have been about three times larger than SJG ones over the estimation sample. Hence, issuing SJG bonds could result in gains at the aggregate level. Notwithstanding, our model also predicts that gains may temporarily vanish in periods of acute fiscal stress. We finally envision postissuance redistribution schemes, whereby gains stemming from the issuance of SJG bonds could be shared among participating countries; we argue that these schemes may alleviate the reduction in market discipline resulting from common bonds issuance.
Keywords: sovereign credit risk; Eurobonds; public debt management; joint liability; term structure of interest rates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4740 (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:2:p:1216-1237
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Management Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().