The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk

Antoinette Schoar (), Kelvin Yeung () and Luo Zuo ()
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Antoinette Schoar: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
Kelvin Yeung: City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong 999077
Luo Zuo: Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 2, 815-833

Abstract: Tracking the movement of top managers across firms, we document the importance of manager-specific fixed effects in explaining heterogeneity in firm exposures to systematic risk. In equilibrium, manager fixed effects on systematic risk are positively related with manager fixed effects on stock returns. These differences in systematic risk are partially explained by managers’ corporate strategies, such as their preferences for internal growth and financial conservatism. The early career experiences of managers starting their first job in a recession also contribute to differential loadings on systematic risk. These effects are more pronounced when managers wield more influence, as in smaller firms and firms that do not have an independent board. Overall, our results suggest that managers play an important role in shaping a firm’s systematic risk.

Keywords: manager fixed effects; systematic risk; managerial style (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:2:p:815-833

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