Fragmented Securities Regulation, Information-Processing Costs, and Insider Trading

Sehwa Kim () and Seil Kim ()
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Sehwa Kim: Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
Seil Kim: Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York, New York 10010

Management Science, 2024, vol. 70, issue 7, 4407-4428

Abstract: Using a unique setting where stand-alone banks submit filings to bank regulators instead of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), we examine the consequences of fragmented securities regulation for information-processing costs and opportunistic insider trading. We find the market reaction to insider-trading filings on FDICconnect is less timely than to those on SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, suggesting FDICconnect generates higher information-processing costs. We also find only large investors trade more on insider-trading filings on FDICconnect than on insider-trading filings on SEC EDGAR, thus extracting benefits from the delayed market reaction to insider-trading filings on FDICconnect. Finally, we find increased insider selling in stand-alone banks prior to negative earnings news, suggesting insiders’ opportunistic use of private information. These findings collectively suggest regulatory fragmentation undermines market efficiency and distorts the level playing field.

Keywords: banks; regulation; FDICconnect; SEC EDGAR; insider trading; information processing costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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